

Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07STATE135366, s) following-up with germany on its efforts to

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#07STATE135366**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
07STATE135366	2007-09-25 21:59	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Secretary of State

Appears in these articles:

[www.spiegel.de](#)

P 252159Z SEP 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

S e c r e t state 135366

E.o. 12958: decl: 09/25/2017
Tags: parm, mtcrc, prel, ettc, gm, sy

Subject: (s) following-up with germany on its efforts to
prevent a shipment of german-origin trucks chassis to
syria's ballistic missile program

Ref: a. State 131559

[1](#)B. Berlin 1770

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM
reasons 1.5 (b), (c) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Berlin, please
see paragraph 5.

[1](#)2. (S) On September 19, the U.S. alerted German authorities
to a shipment of 17 Mercedes-Benz trucks from Germany, to
Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), which

is the lead agency involved in Syria's ballistic missile and WMD programs (Ref A). Because these trucks could be modified in Syria so that they can be used as launchers or support vehicles for a developmental short-range ballistic missile system, we requested German officials immediately investigate this shipment and consider recalling this shipment.

13. (S) In response to this information, we understand the German government issued an individual interdiction order to the German transfer company prohibiting delivery of the trucks. Because these goods were being transferred aboard a Polish-owned vessel, Germany also contacted the Polish government, which subsequently issued instructions to the Polish captain of the ship not to unload the goods. In addition, the German government facilitated contact between the German transfer company and the Polish ship owner, resulting in the German company issuing instructions to the Polish ship owner and captain not to deliver the trucks. In response to these actions, the Syrian consignee demanded the trucks be offloaded and the Syrian harbor master issued an order prohibiting the ship from leaving port unless the trucks are offloaded.

14. (S) On September 25, German authorities reported that the trucks had been unloaded from the Polish vessel, which was permitted to depart port an hour later. This action followed a boarding of the vessel by Syrian authorities and a decision by the Polish captain not to appeal a Syrian court's decision regarding this case because of the limited prospects for success. Factors cited included the end-user's close ties to the Syrian government, the high level of Syrian government interest in the case, the fact that the consignee had already paid for the trucks/shipping, and the ship captain's concern about his crew (the ship had been surrounded by armed Syrian security forces since Saturday). German officials noted that they are still working to determine whether an export license should have been required pursuant to Germany's catch-all control laws to authorize the shipment of these trucks.

15. (S) Department requests Post approach appropriate German officials to express our appreciation for the prompt and decisive measures they took to try to prevent this cargo from reaching Syria's missile program, and highlight the positive PSI cooperation in working with the United States and Poland. In particular, we want to note that the German government took these positive actions despite the fact that this shipment already was enroute to its destination and could result in the FRG needing to pay damages to both the German and Polish entities involved in this case. Post should also convey that such action is indicative of Germany's leadership as an MTCR, HCOC, and PSI partner and its longstanding record of strong support for international missile nonproliferation efforts and we want to thank them for their efforts in this case.

16. (U) Washington POC is XXXXXXXXXXXX (Phone: XXXXXXXXXXXX). Please slug any reporting on this issue for XXXXXXXXXXXX.
Rice

Nnnn

End Cable Text